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NOTES AND COMMENTS

The scope of the cruel and unusual punishments provision has
undergone considerable expansion since the eighth amendment was
adopted in 1791. The Weems5" decision extended its protection
57
to punishments disproportionate to the offense. Trop v. Dulles
recognized that mental anxiety must be considered. Now Robinson
v. California58 has put the legislatures on notice that the Court will
also apply the cruel and unusual punishments clause to the purpose
of a statutory penalty in deciding upon its constitutionality. This
case is an exception to the general rule that constitutional limitations in the area of criminal law do not restrict the power of the states
to define crime, but only restrict the manner in which the states
may enforce their penal codes.
Whether the principle of the Robinson decision will be extended
to strike down other statutes which define offenses in terms of
personal condition must await future litigation.59 By applying the
cruel and unusual punishments provision to the states through the
fourteenth amendment and establishing limitations on the power
of states to define crime, the Supreme Court has significantly enlarged its area of supervision of state penal legislation.
RALPH A. WHITE, JR.
Contracts-Employee Covenants Not to Compete-"Blue
Pencil" Rule
The case of Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender' marks the
first clear application of the "blue pencil" rule2 in employment con"' Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
1356 U.S. 86 (1958).
8370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"In Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229, 236 (1900), the court
stated that conviction under a statute which provided that "all suspicious
persons" could be arrested and prosecuted as criminals, without anything
more, would impose a cruel and unusual punishment. See generally Lacey,
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1203
(1953); Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962).
'255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
Where a contract not to compete contains both lawful and unlawful
restrictions, if the restrictions are stated separably or in the alternative the
court will enforce the valid restrictions and disregard the invalid. In effect
the test is whether the court could take a "blue pencil" and mark out the invalid restrictions, leaving the valid ones to be enforced. E.g., Roane Inc. v.
Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; General Bronze Corp. v.
Schmiling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N.W. 469 (1932); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 518 (1932); 6A CoRaIN,' CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962); 5 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 1659 (rev. ed. 1937).
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tracts in North Carolina. In Welcome Wagon the defendant, a
former employee of the plaintiff, had covenanted not to engage in a
similar business during employment or thereafter for a period
of five years, (1) in Fayetteville, N. C., (2) in any other city or
town in North Carolina where plaintiff was engaged in such business,
(3) in any city or town in the United States in which plaintiff was
engaged in such business, or (4) in any city or town in the United
States in which plaintiff has been or signified its intention to engage
in such business. Shortly after termination of her employment
defendant set up a similar business in Fayetteville and plaintiff sought
to enjoin such competition. Defendant demurred, claiming among
other grounds, that the restrictions contained in the covenant were
unreasonable as to the extent of territory. In overruling the demurrer, the court applied the "blue pencil" rule, saying that if the
parties made divisions of the territory, some reasonable and some
unreasonable, a court of equity will enforce the territorial divisions
deemed reasonable and refuse to enforce those deemed unreasonable.
Restriction (1) (as to Fayetteville) was reasonable and enforceable;
restriction (2) might be reasonable or unreasonable, raising a question for the chancellor; and restrictions (3) and (4) were clearly
unreasonable and thus unenforceable. This is in accord with the
majority.'
There is little North Carolina authority prior to the principal
case dealing with divisible covenants not to compete in employment
contracts. North Carolina has clearly applied the "blue pencil" rule4
to covenants not to compete in contracts for the sale of a business.
However, the prevailing tendency, followed in North Carolina, is to
,distinguish covenants ancilliary to the sale of a business from those
in an employment contract.5
There are two previous North Carolina cases involving employment contracts which seemingly deal with separable territorial
8 Ibid.

Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900), where the restriction ancillary to the sale of a medical practice covered "Yadkinville and
the surrounding territory." The court severed the indefinite "surrounding
territory" restriction and upheld an injunction as to the definite area of
Yadkinville. Accord, Wooten v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 68 S.E. 898 (1910).
'E.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17,
45-46, 105 N.E.2d 685, 703-04 (C.P. 1952), citing among numerous other
authorities, Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944). That they
have been distinguished in regard to application of the "blue pencil" rule see
notes 24, 25 infra and accompanying text.
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covenants, but neither is clear authority for an application of the
rule. In Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin6 the covenant restricted a former
employee from competing in a forty-nine county area and a fifty
mile strip on either side. The lower court injunction covered only
the forty-nine counties. In upholding the lower court's injunction
the opinion made no reference to severability, saying only that the
covenant was "reasonably limited both in respect of time and territory."' Whether the court referred to the separated or the original
covenant cannot be determined.
In Moskin Bros. v. Swartzbergs the court upheld a municipal
court injunction covering only the city of High Point even though
the covenant was much broader in its scope. But the court's only
reference to territory was "we think the covenant is reasonable in its
terms, and not unreasonable in time or territory." 9 In neither case
is there a clear cut application of the "blue penciF' rule."0
On the other hand, the North Carolina court has held that it
will not give partial effect to an "indivisible" promise, i.e. one not
grammatically severable, by granting an injunction to cover only
a reasonable area of a larger territory. In Noe v. McDevitt" the
covenant was not to compete in North and South Carolina. The
plaintiff's business covered only eastern North Carolina, and the
court refused to grant an injunction covering this smaller area,
saying, "the court cannot by splitting up the territory make a new
This
contract for the parties-it must stand or fall integrally."'"
view is not in accord with the more modern approach in which courts
do not depend on grammatical severability, but issue an injunction
3
to cover the reasonable part of an excessive restraint.'
0227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947).
7Id. at 391, 42 S.E.2d at 355.
8 199 N.C. 539, 155 S.E. 154 (1930).
DId. at 545, 155 S.E. at 157.
"oIn Welcome Wagon v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955) the court
of appeals considered a contract from Gastonia, North Carolina almost
identical to that in the principal case. The court of appeals refused to apply
the "blue pencil" rule saying, "we find nothing in the authorities cited by
counsel for Welcome Wagon that militates against this view. See Moskin
Bros. v. Swartzberg . . . Wooten v. Harris... Hauser v. Harding."
1228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947).
2
I d. at 245, 45 S.E.2d at 123.
E.g., Hill v. Central West Pub. Service Co., 37 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.
1930) (restraint throughout Texas, enforced as to city of Dallas);, New
England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1-940)
(restraint as to all New England states, enforced as to one state and parts
of two others); 6A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1390; Williston & Corbin,
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In Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister"4 the court seemingly refused
to apply the rule to a separable list of activities." Here the court
considered a covenant which bound the defendant for three years
after termination of employment not to "either directly or indirectly
engage in the manufacture, sale, or distribution of paper or paper
products within a radius of 300 miles of any office or branch of the
Henley Paper Co. or its subsidiary divisions."'"
The court held
that the contract excluded the defendant from too much territory
and too many activities and was therefore void and unreasonableYT
'The court did not see fit to sever the activity restrictions which were
phrased in the alternative." Thus it seems that the court has been
faced with two covenants where severability was applicable; one concerning activity restrictions (Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister),
the other territory restrictions (Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v.
Pender). The court apparently denied severance in relation to
activities and allowed it in relation to territory. As pointed out by
the dissent in Welcome Wagon, the holdings are clearly inconsistent
in that the rule was applicable in both cases, yet applied only in the
second. This inconsistency raises the question of what the court
will do when faced with a covenant not to compete, otherwise
reasonable except for restrictions as to time 9 or as to persons with
On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit, 23

CONN.

B.J. 40 (1949); Note, 26 N.C.L.

R.Ev. 402 (1948).
,253 N.C. 529, 117 S.E.2d 431 (1960).
" Generally the "blue pencil" rule is applied to separate covenants covering too many businesses or activities, too much time or too broad a class of
persons, as well as excessive territory. John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino,
53 F.2d 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1659
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS, § 518 (1932).
16 253 N.C. at 531, 117 S.E.2d at 432.
'1Id. at 534-35, 117 S.E.2d at 434.
" The court seems to base its holding on Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242,
45 S.E.2d 121 (1947) in which the court, faced with a covenant not grammatically severable, refused to grant an injunction to a lesser reasonable area.
This is applicable to the 300 mile restraint in the present case, and this alone
would make the covenant invalid. However, the court specifically includes
the activities as being unreasonable. The prayer for relief asks the defendant
be enjoined from the "manufacture, sale or distribution" of paper products,
and the plaintiff's brief raises the question of severability.
" Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934)
dealt with a covenant by an employee to assign invention rights, and the
court severed the unreasonable time period. See also 5 WILLISTON, Op. cit.
supra, note 2, § 1659. "No example has been found of comparable draftsmanship as to the time element, although someday a draftsman may summon up
the courage to try 'for 6 months plus 6 months plus . . . for a total of ...
years.'" Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv.
625, 682 n.193 (1960).
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whom the covenantee will not do business,.9 such covenants being
grammatically divisible into valid and invalid units.
At present there is no clear answer to this question. The-decision
in Welcome Wagon makes no mention of overruling Henley Paper
Co. v. McAllister and contains no dicta to indicate extensions of the
rule. In applying the rule the court refers only to territorial restraints2 since this was the only "divisible" issue before the court.
The language in Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister is the broader
of the two,2 2 but in the light of the subsequent Welcome Wagon
decision this language must now be taken as limited. Thus authority
can be found both for extending the rule to new factual situations, or
refusing to do so. An extension would be in accord with leading
authorities.23
By choosing the traditional "blue pencil" rule in the-principal
case, the court refused to follow a trend24 toward the more conservative English view 25 which generally denies the doctrine of
severance in employer-employee contracts when the covenant is harsh
or oppressive. Under this view if the restraint is excessive, though
grammatically severable, the court will reject the whole covenant.
In Welcome Wagon v. Morris26 the contract was almost identical
to that in the principal case and the court of appeals refused severance
saying, "we think the restrictive covenant must be judged as a whole
and must stand or fall when so judged." The North Carolina
court's comment in the principal case was that this case did not follow
the general rule and was not based on the sounder reasoning.
Dubowski & Sons v. Goldstein [1896] 1 Q.B. 478 allowed severance as
regards classes of customers. See also 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 1659.
" 255 N.C. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742.
2 "Whether part of the contract might be deemed reasonable and enforceable is not the question. It comes to us as a single document. We
must construe it as the parties made it. 'The court cannot by splitting up
the territory make a new contract for the parties. It must stand or fall integrally.'" Noe v. McDevitt, 253 N.C. at 535, 117 S.E.2d at 434-35.
2" See authorities cited note 15 supra.
2' "In addition courts are increasingly subscribing to, or at least acting in
accordance with the Mason [English] rule in distinguishing employee restraint cases .... " Blake, supra note 19, at 682 n.193; 5 DUKE B.J.
115 (1956).
255 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2; Farwell, Covenants in Restraint
of
Trade as Between Employer and Employee, 44 L.Q. REv. 66 (1928). This
approach finds its basis in Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [1913]
A.C. 724.
2"224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955).
20
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The question of which of these views follows the sounder
reasoning has been the subject of extensive argument and comment.2 7
The chief argument against the rule is that it gives the employer, who
normally has superior bargaining power, an undue advantage in
that he can draft a wide and oppressive covenant in the alternative,
confident that the court will enforce the reasonable part.28 Also, as
pointed out by the Pender dissent, the covenant in its entirety hangs
over the employee. It is he who must ascertain where the court will
draw the line. 29 Thus, the unreasonable covenant may well be
enforced by intimidation or fear of litigation. 0 Also, by severance,
the court in effect makes a new contract for the parties."'
Under the "blue pencil" rule the emphasis is on form rather than
substance.3 2 "Questions involving legality of contracts should not
depend on form. Public policy surely is not concerned to distinguish differences of wording in agreements of identical meanIt is not really a matter of what the covenant contains,
ing.""3
but how it is drafted. The crucial factor in determining enforcement
is whether or not the covenant is worded in the alternative. This
conclusion is criticized by writers who favor partial enforcement of
34
indivisible promises, rather than the traditional "blue pencil" rule.
On the other hand the employer certainly has an interest to protect. He is not solely interested in oppressing a former employee, but
he has trade secrets, good will, and the like to retain. "[T]his
requires us to recognize that there is such a thing as unfair competition by an ex-employee as well as unreasonable oppression by an
Blake, supra note 19, at 682-84; 5 DUKE B.J. 115 (1956).
See Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [1913] A.C. 724, 745;
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1660.
2 Corbin points out that in the principal case the ex-employee should have
known that competition in Fayetteville was unreasonable, irregardless of
"blue pencil" application. 6A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1390 n. 51.5.
. "It must be remembered that the real sanction at the back of these
covenants is the terror and expense of litigation, in which the servant is
usually at a great disadvantage, in view of the longer purse of his master."
Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [1913] A.C. 724, 745 quoted by
the dissent in the principal case.
1 "By some occult process, the courts adopting this rule convinced themselves that partial enforcement without the aid of a 'blue pencil' would be
making a new contract for the parties, while partial enforcement in the
wake of a 'blue pencil" would not." 6A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1390.
"Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 256, 120 S.E.2d
2

2"

739, 747 (1961) (dissent); Note, 26 N.C.L. REv. 402, 404 (1948).
" 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1660.
" Ibid.; CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1390.
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employer.""5 The court must balance these two interests. Also the
defendant ":should not. object to a lawful restraint which is less than
he voluntarily agreed to and for which he has been paid."3 6 Usually
restrictive covenants are made with employees with executive or sales
ability who fully understand the covenant; not with a workingman
who has nothing to sell but his labor and who must take what he is
offered.
It has been suggested that courts should refuse severance when
it is clear that the employer has exacted an unduly harsh covenant,
and allow severance where the employer acts fairly in trying to
reasonably protect his interests and not impose an undue burden
This would combine the best features of the
on the employee.s
English view and the "blue pencil.""8
But whether or not it has selected the best rule, in Welcome
Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender the North Carolina court has taken a
clear stand on the territorial aspect of covenants not to compete.
With respect to territorial restraints, the court has rejected both the
liberal view which upholds the reasonable part of a grammatically
inseparable covenant and, the English view which denies severance
even where it is grammatically possible. It is clearly established that
North Carolina will apply the "blue pecil" rule to appropriate territorial restrictions, both in contracts for the sale of a business and, by
the principal case, employment contracts.
CHARLES M. WHEDBEE

6A ConnIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1394.

80Breckenridge, Restraint of Trade in North Carolina,7 N.C.L. REv. 249,
258 (1929).
Blake, supra note 19, at 683-84.
8aThe application of this proposed rule will, of course, depend on the particular facts of each case. It would seem that if this rule had been applied
in the principal case, the court would have refused severance, for it seems
that the restrictions here (extending to any city or town in the United
States where employer has signified his intention to operate such business)
are an unduly harsh and unjustified burden. Perhaps if the covenant had
contained only the provisions regarding (1) Fayetteville and (2) North
Carolina, this would not have been deemed unduly harsh and the court could,

under the proposed rule, allow severance. Also the type of covenant in
Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900), covering "Yadkinville
and the surrounding territory" may be one which falls into the latter class
and would not be denied severance. This covenant, on its face, does not seem

excessively harsh and is a good example of a covenant which is not an
undue burden and is also severable.

Blake, ibid, suggests that the burden

should be on the employer to show that he acted fairly towards the employee
and did not impose an unjust burden on him.

